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Abstract—A parked domain is an undeveloped domain which
has no content other than automatically computed advertising
banners and links, used to generate profit. Despite the apparent
popularity of this practice, little is known about parked domains
and domain parking services that assist domain owners in parking
and monetizing unused domains.
This paper presents and in-depth exploration of the ecosystem
of domain parking services from a security point of view, focusing
mostly on the consequences for everyday users who land on
parked pages. By collecting data from over 8 million parked
domains, we are able to map out the entities that constitute
the ecosystem, thus allowing us to analyze the domain owners,
parking services, and advertisement syndicators involved. We
show that users who land on parked websites are exposed to
malware, inappropriate content, and elaborate scams, such as
fake antivirus warnings and costly remote “technicians”. At the
same time, we find a significant number of parked domains to be
abusing popular names and trademarks through typosquatting
and through domain names confusingly similar to authoritative
ones.
Given the extent of observed abuse, we propose a set of
features that are representative of parked pages and build a
robust client-side classifier which achieves high accuracy with
a negligible percentage of false positives.
I. INTRODUCTION
Up until twenty years ago, domain names were available
for free on a first-come, first-serve basis. Network Solutions,
the company that was contracted by the US Defense Infor-
mation Systems Agency to operate the DNS registry, was
imposing at the time a one domain for each person/company
limitation. Because of the high demand, in 1995, Network So-
lutions switched to a paying model which has been preserved
till today.
Apart from the rapid expansion of the web due to the
fact that every person and company desired to have an online
presence, the high demand for domain names was also due to
people buying large amounts of domains in bulk and creating
domain portfolios. These people, later called “domainers”, had
no interest in setting up companies and using their purchased
domains. They had, instead, realized that domains would soon
become a very valuable commodity. As such, they bought
hundreds or thousands of domains under the premise that
real companies would later pay them a large amount of
money in exchange for a desirable domain from their extensive
portfolios. Popular successful examples of this strategy include
domains like wine.com and casino.com both sold for millions
of dollars. Even with the advent of new Top Level Domains
(TLDs), short and generic domains are still occasionally sold
for exorbitant prices [32].
Initially, the owners of large domain portfolios did little
more than wait until an interested buyer contacted them for
one of their domains. Eventually, some people realized that
instead of just idly waiting, domain portfolios could be put
to better use. These people struck deals with other websites
and included banners and “favorite links” for a flat monthly
fee [22]. At the same time, however, a new type of advertising
started appearing on the web, namely, Pay-Per-Click adver-
tising. As the name implies, in this new scheme, a publisher
would only get paid by the advertiser if a user would click on
one of the ads.
Undeveloped domains were a natural fit for this type of ads.
Services started appearing that made it easy for domain owners
to incorporate ads on their domains without worrying about
finding advertisers and setting up contracts. These services
were called domain parking services, since domain owners
would simply “park” their domains at these service providers,
and then the rest would be done automatically. Domain parking
was so successful that owners of large domain portfolios
stopped worrying about selling their domains and instead
started making profit simply because of the commission they
got from the ads that were clicked [22].
Despite of the popularity of the domain parking phe-
nomenon, domain parking services have received little atten-
tion from the security community. Up until recently, these
services were only mentioned in papers studying cybersquat-
ting, showing that domain parking is, by far, the most popular
monetization strategy for cybersquatters [12], [20], [25], [27],
[28], [30], [31]. In recent research, Alrwais et al. studied
domain parking from the point of view of advertisers and
domain owners [15]. They showed that the majority of do-
main parking companies employ shady practices, such as,
hiding clicks from domain owners (thereby not sharing click
commissions), conducting click fraud, and sending unrelated
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traffic to advertisers who pay for traffic with very specific
demographics.
In this paper, we study domain parking services mainly
from the point of view of everyday web users and thus orthogo-
nally to the work of Alrwais et al. [15]. We identify 15 popular
parking services and retrieve a corpus of more than 8 million
parked domains. Through a series of automatic and manual
experiments, we identify the presence of a wide range of
fraud and abuse, targeting users as well as companies. Among
others, we show that typical users landing on parked pages
are exposed to inappropriate ads, malware, elaborate scams
involving “technicians” getting access to a user’s machine and
scripts that detect and bypass advertising blockers. We also
challenge the stance of the most popular ad syndicator who
provides the domain parking ecosystem with the necessary
advertising infrastructure, while at the same time telling its
users that parked pages are spam and are thus hidden from
that syndicator’s search engine.
Given the extent of the discovered abuse, we design and
build a robust classifier for detecting parked domains which
does not rely on hard coded signatures but on distinguishing
features of parked domains with a true-positive rate of 97.9%
and a false-positive rate of only 0.5%. This classifier can
be straightforwardly incorporated in a browser through its
extension system, and alert users whenever they land on a
parked domain.
Our main contributions are:
• We perform the first thorough study of domain parking
services, mapping out the entire ecosystem while
focusing on the abuse affecting everyday web users.
• We show that parked pages expose the user to a series
of dangers including malware, scams and inappropri-
ate content
• We verify the presence of an unacceptably large
number of typosquatting domains parked with popular
domain parking services, and demonstrate the lack
of control when it comes to parking an obviously
typosquatting domain
• We propose a performant classifier for detecting
parked pages, utilizing robust features that are telling
of a website’s nature
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II describes the ecosystem of the domain parking
industry. In Section III, we analyze the domains parked with
these services and we study several of their abusive practices.
Afterwards, Section IV details how we designed a classifier to
detect parked pages. Thereafter, the observations and results of
the paper are further discussed in Section V, followed by an
overview of the related work in Section VI. Lastly, the paper
concludes in Section VII.
II. DOMAIN PARKING ECOSYSTEM
In this section, we first describe the modus operandi of
domain parking services and the various entities involved in
the domain parking ecosystem. We then report on the discovery
of 8 million parked domains, hosted with 15 different parking
services, in an effort to identify how domain parking is
used today and the extent of abuse in terms of trademark
infringements, typosquatting and malicious redirections.
A. What is Domain Parking?
The ecosystem of domain parking consists of four different
parties: domain owners, parking services, advertisement syndi-
cators, and advertisers. Domain owners (or domainers) usually
own a large portfolio of undeveloped domain names, which
they wish to monetize. As long as the monetization strategy
returns more money than the cost of owning and managing a
domain portfolio, this strategy probably is financially attrac-
tive.
Parking services provide hosting and generated content for
domain owners who wish to monetize their domain names. As
the name suggests, the domain owners “park” their domain
names with domain parking services who then manage these
domains and, in return, give the domain owners a share
of their profits. Parking services typically collaborate with
advertisement syndicators to serve purportedly relevant pay-
per-click (PPC) ads from one of their advertising clients.
The operation model of domain parking is depicted in
Figure 1. When a domain owner selects a service to park his
domains, he configures the DNS settings of the domains to
use the name servers of that parking service (1). When a web
user later visits that domain, a parking page is displayed with
content that is dynamically generated by the parking service. In
addition, the parking service includes JavaScript code from an
ad syndicator on the parked page. The syndicator’s code will
attempt to fetch and display ads from a plethora of advertisers,
based on relevant keywords derived from the domain name (2).
For example, if a user visits the parked domain cheapgas.com
the parked page eventually displays ads that, in principle, are
relevant to “cheap gas.” If a user clicks on one of these ads,
he will be sent to the respective advertiser’s website, through
the syndicator’s tracking and redirection mechanisms (3). The
advertiser will pay the syndicator for the visitor, who, in turn,
will pay the parking service for the delivered click. Finally,
the domain owner is given his share for supplying the domain
on which the click was generated (4).
B. How do users end up on parked domains?
A detail that is missing from the above description is the
process through which users end up on parked domains. Since
parked services take, by definition, advantage of undeveloped
domain names, it is unlikely that a user landed on a parked
page by finding and following a link in a search engine, or
on a trustworthy domain. As such, users end up on parked
domains through alternative means.
While today’s search engines are tightly coupled in a user’s
browser (either in a dedicated text field next to the address
bar, or piggybacking on the address bar itself) that was not
always the case. In the past, a user would have to either know
about a specific domain name, or explicitly visit the website
of a search engine and search for relevant content. During that
time, browsing the web involved significantly more typing of
domain names in a browser’s URL bar than it does today.
For known sites, users would typically need to memorize
the domain name of a website and manually type it, in full,
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Fig. 2. Number of found domains for the 15 observed parking services.
parked domains from the 15 observed parking services. Since
the DNS Census is outdated (and likely incomplete), this
means that at the time of this writing, there exist at least 8
million domains whose sole purpose is to serve ads when they
are visited.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the gathered domains
with each service. One can quickly notice that even though
many parking services exist, only a handful of them are
responsible for managing the majority of parked domains. That
is, 60% of the discovered domains are parked with the three
most popular services: Sedo Parking, Internet Traffic and Cash
Parking.
III. ANALYSIS OF PARKED DOMAINS
In this section we study several characteristics and practices
of parked domains. We start by inspecting the 8 million
gathered domain names and map out their typosquatting abuse.
Next, we randomly sample several thousand parked domains
which we crawl automatically using PhantomJS [7], an in-
strumented browser, while saving the HTML of every loaded
frame, logging all HTTP requests and taking a screenshot.
Furthermore, we collected WHOIS data for these domains.
This data is then used to map out advertising networks, domain
owners, trademark abuse, malicious redirects and ad-blocker
detection mechanisms.
A. Parked Domain Owners
To get an understanding of parked domain ownership,
we request WHOIS data for 3000 randomly-selected parked
domains. We parse the WHOIS records using Ruby Whois [18]
and filter out the records that are anonymized or unparseable.
From the remaining 1,582 domains, we extract the registrant,
administrator, and technical contact details and group together
the domains that list the same name, email address and
organization. As a final step, we manually merge clusters of
domains for which we are certain belong to the same individual
or organization. In total, we find 910 distinct domain owners
to which the 1,582 domains belong. Figure 3, shows that a
small number of them is responsible for the majority of parked
domains. For instance, 50% of domains is owned by 15.6%
(142) of owners. This means that next to owners who posses
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
15.6% 25.0% 50.0% 75.0% 100.0%
Domain owners (%)
Pa
rk
e
d 
do
m
ai
ns
 (%
)
Fig. 3. The percentage of distinct owners and their cumulative share in
possession of parked domains.
a couple of domains and use domain parking services, there
are individuals with very large collections of domains, all of
which are registered to simply serve ads.
B. Advertisement Syndicators
Advertising is the lifeblood of domain parking services.
In order to generate revenue from parked domains, parking
services usually serve pay-per-click (PPC) advertisements to
visitors. Every time that a user clicks on an advertisement
situated on a parked page, both the domain owner, as well as
the domain parking service itself are paid a small commission.
While a domain parking service could, in principle, directly
accept ads from people who wish to advertise their products
and services and then display them on their own parked
pages, it is easier and more scalable for them to use existing
advertising infrastructure of third-party ad syndicators.
The integration of these syndicators involves little more
than the inclusion of remote JavaScript libraries from the
servers of the syndicator. These libraries are responsible for
assessing the content of the page, fetch and display ads from
other third-party servers, deliver the user who clicks on an ad
to the advertiser who paid for that ad and register that action
so that the publishing site (in this case the domain parking
service) can receive the appropriate commission.
In search for these syndicators, we sampled 3,000 parked
domains, crawled them, and inspected their source code for
ad-related remote JavaScript inclusions. In total, we found
only four advertisement syndicators that provided ad-related
JavaScript code, Adsense, Doubleclick, Media.net and Chango,
as shown in Figure 4. Their aggregate presence reaches
91%±1% of the parked websites. The other 9%±1% were
either redirects (7%±0.9%) (described later in Section III-F)
or had no identifiable advertising code (2%±0.05%). Since
domain parking services depend on advertising, we assume
that the latter was due to some temporal server-side miscon-
figuration.
Doubleclick and Adsense, both Google products, were
present in 90%±1.1% and 88%±1.2% of parked websites
respectively. While, given the ubiquitous nature of Google
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Fig. 4. Different third-party JavaScript advertisement syndicators and their
presence on parked domains. The horizontal dashed line represents the amount
of websites that included at least one third-party ad syndicator
in the modern web, this comes as no surprise, there is an
interesting back story that is worth mentioning.
Google used to manage their own domain parking service,
that was operating in a fashion similar to the 15 services
studied in this paper. In 2012, Google ceased their own hosted
parking service [4], possibly due to typosquatting lawsuits such
as Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google, Inc. [10]. In this lawsuit,
the plaintiffs claimed the Google’s parking program as a
“massive scheme to generate billions of advertising dollars
through the parking of domain names that are the same
as or substantially and confusingly similar to the plaintiffs’
distinctive trade names or trademarks.” In addition to stopping
their own domain parking products, Google is, at the time of
this writing, stating on their fighting spam page that: “Parked
domains are placeholder sites with little unique content, so
Google doesn’t typically include them in search results.” [19]
One can easily spot the contradiction of these statements
when compared to the pervasiveness of Google as an ad-
syndicator for domain parking services. We thus find it hard to
reconcile Google’s decision to keep parked pages away from
its search results, while still profiting by being the most popular
advertising syndicator in known domain parking services.
C. Typosquatting abuse
Prior research investigating the phenomenon of typosquat-
ting has established that the preferred monetization approach of
domain squatters is the use of parking services [25], [31]. Yet
typosquatting sites are illegal under the Anti-Cybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), which prohibits registration
and use of domain names that are identical or confusingly
similar to a trademark. As such, a domain parking service
should, in principle, always be wary of people trying to park
typosquatting domains.
In order to measure the prevalence of typosquatting in
the investigated parking services, we perform several “reverse-
typo” transformations on the parked domains and attempt to
discover whether these transformation result in an authoritative
domain. We define an authoritative domain, as a domain that
is ranked higher on the Alexa global list than its potential
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Fig. 5. Percentage of typosquatting domains present per service. The dashed
line represents the relative amount of typosquatting domains present in all 8
million domains (1.63%).
typosquatted version. Consider, for instance, the currently
parked domain vacebook.com. This website does not belong
in Alexa’s top 1 million sites thus it automatically receives the
lowest possible rank. One of our reverse-typo transformations
will produce facebook.com, the domain belonging to the
popular social network and ranked as the second most popular
website of the Internet. Since this domain is ranked higher than
the parked vacebook.com, we automatically mark the latter as
a typosquatting domain.
Our transformation models were mainly inspired by Wang
et al. [31], which introduced missing-dot, character-omission,
character-permutation, adjacent character-substitution and
character-insertion typo models. For some models, we had
to develop the reverse operation, because of their non-
bidirectional properties, such as for the missing-dot and
character-insertion typo models. For the missing-dot model, we
used heuristics to identify the place where a dot has to be added
(e.g. add a dot in wwwfacebook.com after the “www” se-
quence of characters). Additionally, for the character-insertion
model we defined a subset, namely, the character-duplication
model, which only takes into account the accidental repetition
of a character in the domain name. In order to reverse the
character-duplication model, we had to identify a sequence
of repeated characters and deduplicate them. Furthermore, we
chose to discard the “reverse-typo” character-omission model
due to high chances of false positives. Finally, in addition to the
aforementioned models, we also introduced a TLD-substitution
model which changes the top-level domain (TLD) with another
popular one, for example from com to us.
We applied the reverse-typo transformations to the 8 mil-
lion parked domains and found a total of 131,673 typosquatting
domains (1.63%). The distribution, however, of these domains
across parking services is anything but uniform. Figure 5
shows the percentage of typosquatting abuse for each studied
service. TrafficZ is the only service with no typosquatting
domains in its observed portfolio. The service with the biggest
relative presence is Above with over 4%, followed by Domain-
Sponsor and RookMedia. A positive finding is that the most
popular parking services, as listed in Fig. 2 are also the services
with less than average typosquatting abuse.
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D. Parking a Typosquatting Domain
In the previous section we established that unfortunately,
typosquatting domains are by no means rare on the investigated
domain parking services. In this section, we approach the prob-
lem from the opposite side. Instead of trying to identify parked
typosquatting domains, we want to quantify the “hurdles” that
domain squatters have to go through in order to successfully
park their domain names, i.e., we try to assess the parking
services’ selectiveness in terms of excluding obviously abusive
domains.
With explicit permission of the authoritative company, we
register a typosquatting domain of a high profile and well
known website, stackoverflow.com. At the time of writing (July
2014), this website is the 53rd most popular website in the
world, according to Alexa. More specifically, we registered a
character-permutation typo domain, namely stcakoverflow.com
which we then attempted to park with each service on which
we managed to register an account. During this process, we
discovered that the domain name was owned by a typosquatter
in the past: it was registered from August 2012 until it expired
a year later. During that time, the domain was parked with
four of the services under analysis. Since these services had
already record of this domain name belonging to a different
user, they required an extra “verification” step. The verification
simply involved emailing the support and optionally sending
a screenshot of our registrar’s account details. Even with the
extra attention of a verification step involving a human operator
verifying our screenshots, not a single service denied the
submission of this abusive domain. Every service hosted the
typosquatting domain for at least a week, until we transferred
it to the next one. According to the services’ statistics, the
parking page was receiving visitors daily.
While our experience with the process of parking a single
typosquatting domain does not necessarily generalize to the
parking of hundreds of abusive domains, they are in line with
the findings of the aforementioned domain-squatting studies,
namely, that for domain parking services, taking advantage
of squatting domains appears to be part of their everyday
operations.
E. Trademark abuse
While typosquatting domains belong to the trademark
abuse category, not every domain that abuses trademarks is
necessarily a typosquatting domain. Consider, for example,
the currently parked domain facebookonline.com. This domain
clearly abuses on Facebook’s trademark, yet it would never be
automatically generated by the aforementioned typosquatting
models. Historically, such abusive domains have been called
“cousin domains” [21] and have been often associated with
phishing since it is unlikely that an everyday user of the
web will think that facebookonline.com is not associated with
facebook.com.
As done in the earlier sections, we again make use of
sampling to cope with the large amount of data. That is, we
randomly selected 500 parked domains, manually extracted
each domain’s distinct keywords (e.g. the words facebook
and online for the aforementioned example) and queried
a popular search engine for these keywords. If the results
revealed the presence of an obviously similarly named website
or organization, we mark the domain as abusive.
Out of the 500 investigated parked domains, 79
(16%±3.2%) domains were clearly abusing trademarks of
existing companies and websites.
More specifically, in 44 (9%±2.5%) of the cases, the do-
mains were found to be typosquatting, while in the remaining
35 (7%±2.2%), the domains obviously contained trademarks.
The percentage of typosquatting domains is significantly larger
than the one that we automatically calculated in Section III-C
suggesting that our typosquatting models provided a very
conservative estimate of the magnitude of the problem. The
reason for this discrepancy is that the typosquatting models that
we used, do not cover all typographical errors abused in the
wild. For instance, in our manual sample we noticed the abuse
of homonyms, e.g., theheneryford.org abusing the authoritative
thehenryford.org as well as character-omission typos which
were excluded from our earlier analysis.
To gain insights on what type of advertisements end up
on trademark-abusing domains, we also looked closely at
the ads captured by our crawlers. There, we found that 29
(6%±2%) of domains abusing existing trademarks, displayed
advertisements of a competitor. This means that when a
user lands on such a trademark-abusive domain, not only
would the trademark holder “lose” that user’s visit, but the
user could potentially end up on a website of a competing
company. Given the presence of advertising syndicators and
automatically computed advertisements based on the keywords
in a domain name, we can relatively safely conclude that the
blame here is with the domain parking service which did not
check whether the domain was abusing trademarks, rather than
with the competitor who ended up receiving the user.
F. Malicious redirections
Domain parking companies state that they provide a le-
gitimate service that help visitors by showing them relevant
advertising links [22]. While this can be true for domains
without any trademark or typosquatting issues, there is another
phenomenon that makes us even more skeptical about the
goodwill of domain parking services.
Out of our initial 3,000 randomly sampled pages, our
instrumented browser was redirected to a different domain
in 7%±0.9% of the cases, a feature of parking services that
is called Pay-Per-Redirect (PPR) [15]. Note that our crawler
never clicks on any advertising links thus the redirection can be
fully attributed to the domain parking service. In a preliminary
examination of these redirections, we witness the landing on
dubious websites including, among others, malware, scams,
and affiliate abuse.
In order to examine this phenomenon more thoroughly, we
sampled 100 domains from each parking service and setup
an additional crawler which crawled them daily for a week.
During this crawl, we recorded the entire redirection chain,
visited and downloaded all links present on the final page,
and kept track of all downloaded data and files. To assess any
geographical differences, we performed this crawl in parallel
from the United States and one country from Europe. Table II
shows that ten out of fifteen studied services are conducting
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ads was also recently observed Nikiforakis et al. [29] who
studied malicious advertising in the context of ad-based URL
shortening services.
Figure 6 summarizes the redirection chains of seven ser-
vices that have been found to redirect to malware-laden
websites. The graph shows that many intermediate parties are
involved in leading a visitor to a malicious website and several
nodes account for redirections of multiple services, such as
zeroredirect2.com. Possibly, these complex chains are
the consequence of a process similar to ad arbitration, a widely
adopted practice performed by most ad syndicators [33].
During this process, the syndicator bids on available ad slots
of other publishers or syndicators, allowing them to resell
these slots to the next bidder. Often, ad slots are subjected to
multiple iterations of this reselling process. As a consequence,
ad slots are no longer under control of the syndicator that
the original publisher partnered with. All these interactions
and intermediate parties have the potential to blur the direct
involvement of the parking service in serving malware. In
some cases, however, we also see malware being delivered
more directly, for example, by the parent company of Parking
Service 8.
In terms of scams, we encountered several different kinds
of campaigns. In one campaign, spanning eight different do-
mains, the advertiser was trying to persuade users to hand
over highly sensitive information, such as their Social Se-
curity Number, to allegedly retrieve the user’s creditworthi-
ness. In one particular case, typosquatting domains, such as
banjofamerica.com, were used to increase the credibility of the
scam. The displayed page had a special notice for “Bank of
America visitors” warning them to urgently check their credit
score because of a security breach.
Another kind of scam, of which we found two campaigns
residing on three domains, claims that the visitor’s computer is
infected with malware. The web page insists on calling a given
phone number for support. An example of this is depicted
in Figure 7, which abuses the Norton logo to increase its
trustworthiness. We called two of these numbers, pretending to
be a clueless victim. Both “support lines” offered us assistance
for the bogus infection. They required us to install a remote
desktop application and inspected our machine for malware.
For the purposes of this experiment, we setup a virtual machine
running Microsoft Windows XP and installed a handful of
popular desktop applications. Since we had just created these
virtual machines for our experiment, we are confident that no
malware was present on our systems.
The two “technicians” who were given remote access to
our machine, used similar social engineering techniques to try
to convince us that our computer was infected with malware.
More specifically, they inspected our list of processes and
showed us completely benign warnings from the Windows
Event Viewer log, which they claimed were there because
of malware. One service offered to remove this malware for
150 USD, the other asked 250 USD, plus another 250 USD
to install antivirus software3. Other scams involved the user’s
participation in surveys which convince users to disclose their
sensitive information by promising them high value coupons
3An audiovisual recording of this call can be viewed online at http://vimeo.
com/101502467, with the password NDSS2015
Fig. 7. Screenshot of a scam website to which our crawler was redirected
after visiting a parking page.
for big box stores which, somewhat predictably, are never
delivered.
When one considers both regions, all ten services were
found to redirect to malware or scams at some point during
those seven days.
Finally, the last category of observed malicious redirections
leads to adult websites. We encountered seven domains hosting
pornographic content. As seen in Table II, such redirections
were most prevalent in our European crawler. Seven of the
parked domains that redirected to adult material originated
from adult-oriented parked domain names, specifically those
parked with Parking Service 5 and 6. We assume users
expect to be exposed to adult content when typing in such
domain names, therefore, these redirections were considered
non-malicious and put in parenthesis. However, the other
42 parked domains that automatically redirected to pages
with sexually explicit content were either unrelated or even
completely inappropriate, such as southwestairlanes.com and
arabianmarriage.com and thus considered as malicious redirec-
tions.
Overall, while malicious advertisers are ultimately respon-
sible for malicious ads, one cannot fully excuse the domain
parking services involved in putting users in harm’s way. The
large percentages of discovered abuse suggest either a com-
plete lack of countermeasures against malicious advertising, or
the presence of very ineffective ones. Moreover, given the way
that some of these scams were set up, we think that it would be
really hard to successfully press charges against these services,
since, for instance, in the scam involving virus warnings, the
user voluntarily calls their support centers and gives them ac-
cess to his machine. These kinds of scams show that legislation
is not always sufficient to protect or compensate users, and thus
highlights the necessity of technological countermeasures and
user education.
G. Detecting and Bypassing Ad-Blockers
Today, some of the most popular extensions in browser
markets are ad-blocking extensions. These extensions typi-
cally operate by scanning each web page against a black-
list of advertising-related regular expressions and prevent the
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matched content from being loaded. Since domain parking ser-
vices mostly rely on visitors clicking on, usually omnipresent,
advertisements for their revenue, the adoption of these tools
is a big threat to their business model. For each investigated
service, we tested whether the domains parked with them tried
to detect or bypass the workings of ad-blocking extensions.
Note that since these services have full control of their parked
domains, the discovery of a parked domain being involved in a
specific practice equates to the parking service being involved
in that same practice. Overall, we discovered that 2 out of the
15 studied services attempted to detect and bypass advertising
blockers.
a) NameDrive: NameDrive ships their parked websites
with an additional detection mechanism for ad blockers. They
include an external file called advertisements.js. However,
unlike the file name suggests, this file does not contain any
code related to advertisements: it is just a single statement
that sets a variable to false. This file is basically a honeypot
for ad blockers: it deliberately attempts to trigger the blocking
of resources by exposing a very obvious advertising-related
filename for its JavaScript code. The file is detectable by
the "/advertisements." present in the EasyList [1]
blacklist, one of the most common blacklists used by a range
of ad-blocking extensions, including the popular AdBlock
Plus. Later on, another script included on the page verifies
if the variable was actually set to false or not. If not,
the user is automatically redirected to a completely different
website for PPR monetization, as described in Section III-F,
since no money can be made from this user from regular
PPC advertising schemes. As such, we expect the number of
redirections to be higher for users browsing with ad-blocking
extensions.
b) Fabulous.com: Websites parked with Fabulous con-
tain JavaScript code that verifies whether the JavaScript object
named google exists. This object is normally initialized by
a Google Adsense script included in the parked page. If
this object does not exist, one can reasonably assume that
advertisements are blocked. Subsequently, the web page reacts
by creating iframes with content generated from other Fabulous
pages. The generated content contains internal advertisement
links, which when clicked, eventually redirect the user to the
websites of advertisers.
H. Summary of Findings
By analyzing more than 8 million parked domains, hosted
with 15 different services, we found that the lion’s share of
the domain parking ecosystem is under the control of a small
fraction of the involved entities. For instance, we discovered
that the majority of domains are in the hands of a small
fraction (16%) of all domain owners, and that just the three
most popular parking services are accommodating over 60% of
the examined domains. This trend continues when it comes to
the monetization through advertisements, as a single, popular,
advertising syndicator provides PPC ads for 90%±1.1% of all
visits to parked domains. Since only a handful of parties is
responsible for the majority of the ecosystem’s monetization
chain, we argue that a change in policy or the business
model of these large players, could drastically and effectively
influence the domain parking scene.
In terms of abuse, we found that only one parking service
did not include typosquatting domains in their managing
portfolios, with all other services accepting and profiting
from these abusive domains. Specifically, through automatic
measurements, we conservatively estimated that a service’s
domain portfolio may contain over 4% typosquatting domains.
In a more in-depth manual sample analysis, however, we found
16%±3.2% of parked domain names to be either trademark
or typosquatting abuse. A reasonable assumption is that ty-
posquatting domains receive more visitors than most generic
parked domain names, thus contributing to a large extent to
the profits generated in the domain parking industry. As such,
foregoing the profits associated with accepting typosquatting,
and other cybersquatting domains, is likely not something that
these services will do voluntarily.
Furthermore, we examined the Pay-Per-Redirect (PPR)
phenomenon, which is used as a secondary monetization
source, performed in 7%±0.9% of the visits to parked do-
mains. All ten services deploying this redirection strategy have
been found to unexpectedly send their visitors to malware-
laden websites, scams or explicit adult content. This phe-
nomenon shows that parking services are not reluctant to
deploy malicious monetization strategies at the expense of user
safety.
IV. DETECTING PARKED DOMAINS
The previous section analyzed the ecosystem of domain
parking and mapped out the practices involved in their business
model. Based on our findings, we do not consider it much
of a stretch to claim that, at their current state-of-practice,
domain parking services act in a parasitic way. As such, it
is important to implement countermeasures in order to reduce
their prevalence or at least minimize the user’s exposure to
them. We approach this problem by proposing and developing
a classification model that is able to detect parked pages. This
model is meant to be robust, meaning that it does not rely
on any parking services’ specifics, such as their specific name
servers, but rather relies on features inherent to the conceptual
operations of parked domains. Applications for this model exist
on various levels, e.g., it could be part of a search engine
crawler, where the detection could be used to discard parked
pages from their search results, or part of a browser extension
that detects and blocks parked pages when a browsing user
encounters one.
In this section, we walk through the construction of the
classification model by describing how the data was gathered,
which features were used, how the model was tuned, and how
the classifier was trained and evaluated.
A. Gathering data
We begun this process by first obtaining a random sample
of 3,000 verified parked pages and 3,000 pages from the Alexa
top 1 million. We automatically verified that the sampled pages
from Alexa are not parked by examining their name servers and
ensuring that they do not match the name servers of any of the
studied parking services. Next, we crawled all 6,000 pages and
collected data from several different sources. More specifically,
we gathered the HTML source code of every loaded frame
recursively, recorded a trace of all HTTP requests initiated by
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the web page (HAR), as well as the redirection chains of the
main page and every frame. Finally, we inspected properties
of the domain itself, such as typosquatting occurrence and
WHOIS records. From this data, we can extract discriminative
features that can serve as input for our classifier.
B. Feature set
When creating features to detect parked pages, we try to
target the inherent nature of the parking services’ operation
model. This approach results in more robust detection, as
opposed to searching for traces of specific parking services
or looking for fixed keywords.
We focus on detecting the omnipresence of third-party
advertising, dynamic and on-the-fly page generation, lack of
content, malicious redirections, and abusive domains. In total,
we construct eleven HTML features, five HAR features, four
frame features and one domain feature. We elaborate on the
extraction of each feature and our rational for choosing them
in the following paragraphs:
HTML Features: The HTML features are extracted from the
source code of every loaded frame. From this code we can
analyze the content and the scripts deployed on the page.
• Average and maximum link length. We count the
number of <a> elements present on the page and
measure the string length of the destination addresses.
From these numbers, we can calculate the average
and maximum link length of the page. The rationale
behind this feature is that advertisement links, which
usually form the majority on domain parked websites,
pass more and longer parameters along with the link
in order to track the click on the PPC ad. They might,
for example, include the publisher’s identifier, the final
link destination, tokens, timestamps, etc.
• Average source length. Similar to the previous fea-
ture, source addresses for banners and other advertise-
ment media, tend to pass parameters of campaigns, im-
age dimensions, etc. We expect non-parked websites
to have more static media sources and thus shorter
address lengths.
• External link and external source ratio. We define
an external link or source as one with an address point-
ing to a another domain. Links and media generated
by third-party advertisement syndicators will generally
reside on domains of that syndicator. We expect non-
parked websites to have a lower ratio of external links,
because they commonly also have links to pages and
media hosted on the same domain.
• Website directory presence. Since parked domains
are undeveloped websites that display content that
is generated on-the-fly, it is uncommon for them to
have dedicated directories on their website. We search
within the HTML source and link addresses for the
presence of a directory and use this as a boolean
feature.
• Link-to-global text ratio. Many parked pages have
hardly any text on their page that is not part of a
link. On a typical parked page, text is either part
of an ad or part of the “Related links”. To assess
this characteristic, we extract all text from the HTML
pages with Python’s Natural Language Toolkit [16],
which omits the HTML tags and returns the textual
content. We compare the amount of text that resides
within links (<a> elements and their child nodes) to
the global amount of text present on the page.
• Amount of non-link characters. To more robustly
test the characteristic of the previous feature, we
incorporate an additional feature that counts the ac-
tual amount of characters not belonging to any link
element, instead of solely relying on the ratio.
• Text-to-HTML ratio. We also measure the ratio of
text to the total amount of characters in the HTML file.
This feature focuses more on the dynamic generation
of content.
• Redirection mechanisms Parked pages use redi-
rection mechanisms to lead visitors to other pages
or domains. Although non-parked pages might
also deploy such mechanisms, we still believe
that this feature, when considered together with
other ones, can assist classification. We detect
two different redirection methods. One feature
records the presence of JavaScript redirection code
by searching for window.location, while the
other finds HTML meta refreshes by looking for
http-equiv="refresh".
HAR Features: These features are derived from the HTTP
archive (HAR) that is constructed while loading a page. We
focus on the following discriminative characteristics of HTTP
requests:
• Third-party requests ratio. We extract the number of
HTTP requests to third-parties (other domains) and the
total amount of requests. Next, we calculate the ratio
between those two. This feature is motivated by the
amount of third-party content and media generated on
parked pages. In addition, HTTP requests conducted
after redirecting to a different domain, are all con-
sidered third-party requests, with respect to the initial
domain.
• Third-party data ratio. Similarly, we calculate the
ratio between data (number of bytes) coming from
third-party sources and all incoming data.
• Third-party HTML content ratio. This feature fur-
ther incorporates the characteristics of third-party con-
tent. We expect most third-party content on regular
websites to be generally JavaScript libraries and media
files. Parked websites, however, are known to include
html/text content pulled from third-party services,
such as through the use of iframes generated by ad
syndicators. For this reason, we include a specific
feature that represents the ratio of HTML content
brought in by third-party requests.
• Initial response size and ratio. For this feature,
we first record the size of the initial response when
making the first request to the web page. Next, we
compare this with the total amount of received data
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after completely loading the website. This feature
attempts to capture the dynamic generation of content
on parked pages which is a core concept of the
modus operandi of domain parking services. With this
feature, we expect to identify the initial lightweight
page skeleton, which stands in contrast with the final
amount of received data.
Frame Features: The following frame features are extracted
by tracking every loaded frame on the web page.
• Amount of frames. While manually inspecting the
structure of parked pages, we found that the presence
of iframes is very common. In order to take this into
account, we recursively count all frames and iframes
present on a page and its child frames.
• Main frame and iframe redirections. The redirection
chain of every frame was tracked when we crawled
the domains. For every chain, we extract the number
of redirections that occur on the main frame as well
as all other frames. As noted in previous sections,
malicious redirects initiating at parked pages contain
many different traffic distributors and redirection hops,
e.g., as shown in Figure 6. Thus, we expect a benign
redirection chain to consist of a limited amount of
intermediate steps.
• Different final domain. This feature checks if the
main frame (i.e. the frame of which the address
is visible in the browser’s URL bar) was redi-
rected to a different domain. It excludes internal
redirections, such as from www.domain.com to
blog.domain.com, which is a more common redi-
rection process on regular websites.
Domain name feature: This feature focus on characteristics
inferred from the domain name itself.
• Typosquatting domain. The current domain name is
checked for typosquatting abuse with the algorithm de-
scribed in III-C. Regular, authoritative websites should
not be flagged by this feature.
C. Classification
Our objective is to construct a classifier that can reliably
detect parked websites when visiting them. When loading a
web page, the aforementioned features are extracted and are
treated as the features of a particular instance. The classifi-
cation model’s goal is to take an unknown instance as input,
process the features, and assign a probability of that instance
belonging to a certain class. More specifically, the model
calculates whether or not any given web page is likely a parked
one. Given these probabilities, a threshold value can be used to
actually classify the instance as either parked or non-parked.
This threshold can then be appropriately varied to tune the
sensitivity of the model.
In order to build the classifier, we first select an appropriate
learning algorithm for our model. Afterwards, this model needs
to be given a sufficient amount of parked and non-parked
instances for it to learn from. Once a model is learned, we
can evaluate the performance of the classifier with unseen test
instances.
1) Learning method: We aim for high interpretability of
our classifier, as it is important to comprehend the prediction
of the classifier for further improvement and adaptability. This
quality of a classifier is also important if our model is to be
incorporated in a browser and be used by users. Therefore,
we opt for the Random Forest algorithm, as it combines the
strength of ensemble learning with the interpretability qualities
of decision trees. Furthermore, decision trees tend to be robust
with regard to outliers, while the ensemble technique of Ran-
dom Forest protects the model against overfitting. Moreover,
after the trees have been constructed in the learning phase, the
classification is usually very quick in the detection phase.
2) Dataset handling:
a) Train and test dataset: The set of instances used in
the learning phase of the model is referred to as the training
set, for which we reserve 2/3 of our dataset of 6,000 pages.
As follows, 1/3 of the set is isolated and used after the model
is built, in order to adequately evaluate our classifier. Since
these instances are used to test a classifier, they are referred
to as the test set.
b) Data transformation: In order not to overfit the clas-
sifier, we remove outliers and extreme values from our training
set using an interquartile range filter, which is configured to
operate on a per feature basis.
c) Omitted features: Our initial set of features con-
tained two additional features, which, however, were omitted
after manual and algorithmic selection.
One of these features was based on the detection of
WHOIS entries that make use of anonymizing services, such as
WhoisGuard [11]. We expected parked domain owners to have
a higher incentive to anonymize their personal association with
their domains, as opposed to regular domain owners. However,
when manually inspecting the features of the training set, we
found that this feature was not very discriminative for parked
domains. Furthermore, since it required searching for specific
strings related to anonymizing services, the feature is also less
robust. For these reasons, the feature was removed from our
final model.
To further improve our feature selection, a backwards
greedy stepwise search was conducted on the remaining feature
set. The search started with the complete feature set, and
removed features one by one until a better classification result
was achieved. The algorithm found that another feature was
reducing the performance of the classifier. This particular fea-
ture counted the number of times the parked domain name was
passed along with HTTP request parameters. The reasoning
behind this feature was that, often, the domain name is sent
as a parameter in a request to a third-party. Parked domains
do this in order to enable the parking service to return content
or ads relevant to the given domain, as described by Wang et
al. [31]. Nevertheless, the feature was found to confuse our
classifier and was thus omitted from the model.
3) Evaluation: After transforming the data and selecting
the best performing features, we built a model from our train-
ing set using Random Forest with 10-fold cross validation. As
a model’s performance is not determined by its effectiveness on
the training set, but on its ability to classify unknown instances,
our test set was used for evaluation purposes. The trained
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VI. RELATED WORK
In concurrent work, Alrwais et al. [15] investigated the
domain parking industry, focusing on the fraudulent practices
in their monetization chain. In their work, the authors reg-
istered themselves both as domain owners and advertisers,
effectively operating at both ends of the domain parking
ecosystem. This allowed them to connect the dots and detect
any discrepancies between what they knew to be true and
what the domain parking services claimed as true. Using this
method, the authors uncovered several fraudulent practices
including the presence of click fraud, where their advertising
campaigns were charged for receiving visitors through clicks,
even though the visitors were the researchers’ crawlers which
were configured to never “click” on any ads.
While Alrwais et al. focus their investigation on the abuse
against advertisers, we instead focus on the abuse against
users landing on parked domains, as well as domain owners
whose trademarks are being diluted because of the absence of
trademark-infringing checks from the domain parking services.
Though our work is orthogonal to their work, we both arrive
at the same conclusion: Domain parking services are currently
unlegislated and that allows for a lot of abuse, towards all
third-parties of the domain parking ecosystem: users landing
on parked pages, advertisers paying for ads, and holders
of popular trademarks and domain names. To that extent,
a client-side countermeasure, like the parked-page classifier
we propose in this paper, can protect the user-part of this
ecosystem while we hopefully transit to a more legislated
domain parking industry.
In 2010, Almishari et al. [14] developed a classifier for
“ads-portal” domains, which they used to identify typosquat-
ting abuse of domain parking services. They observed that in
2008, 50% of parked pages were residing on typosquatting
domains. Now, 6 years later, we witness that parking services
have a significantly smaller, albeit still substantial, typosquat-
ting portfolio. The classifier they developed leveraged several
HTML features similar to the ones proposed in this paper. For
instance, they focused on the dominant presence of anchor and
image elements and the numerous parameters passed along
with these URLs. However, they did not incorporate HAR
features, which are able to identify the dynamic and external
nature of parking pages. Furthermore, they did not take into
account redirections and no in-depth frame analysis was made.
In terms of performance, they incorporated keyword-based
features to increase the accuracy of the classifier, a strategy
that we deliberately avoided in order to ensure robustness.
Domain parking was also recently mentioned by Li et
al. who studied generic malicious web infrastructures [23].
Interestingly, the authors observed that domains hosting ma-
licious Traffic Distribution Systems (TDS), were monetized
through parking services after the TDS had been taken down.
Even after a take down, these domains keep on receiving a
large amount of traffic since numerous malicious doorways
(typically compromised websites) are still redirecting users to
the TDS domain.
Prior to the aforementioned research, domain parking was
only mentioned in research regarding cybersquatting. One of
the oldest studies of typosquatting by Wang et al. [31] proposed
a series of typosquatting models and showed that, in 2006,
51% of all the possible typosquatting domains of websites in
the Alexa top 10,000 were registered and active. The authors
uncovered that 59% of the active typosquatting domains were
hosted at 6 major domain parking companies and reported
that inappropriate adult content was encountered on typos of
children’s websites.
In a later study, Moore and Edelman tried to identify the
entities responsible for typosquatting [25]. The researchers
observed that name servers belonging to parking companies
have up to 4 times more typosquatting domains than average.
In terms of advertising, they identified Google as the prime
source for PPC ads on typosquatted domains. Furthermore,
they encountered abusive domains to be serving ads for the au-
thoritative domain (self-advertising) and for competitors. Ad-
ditionally, they measured a similar concentration phenomenon
as to what we noted in the domain parking ecosystem: 63%
of typosquatting domains that were using Google PPC ads,
belonged to only 5 different publisher IDs. In our study, we
observed that not only Google maintains almost complete
control of advertising in domain parking services, but that they
do so while claiming that domain parking pages are spam [19].
In a very recent content-based typosquatting study, Agten
et al. [12] verified that parked pages are still the most
prominent monetization strategy for typosquatting domains.
More specifically, ad parking was witnessed in 51% of ob-
servations. Furthermore, they detected malicious redirections
towards malware, scams and adult content. Taking into account
the observations from our research, it is likely that these
redirections were initiated by parking services that hosted the
typosquatting domains.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite existing for over ten years, managing millions
of domain names, and making yearly revenues of multiple
millions of dollars, domain parking services have received little
attention so far.
In this paper, we mapped the ecosystem of domain parking
services by identifying popular parking services, the types of
parked domains, the owners of these parked domains, and the
advertising content that users are exposed to when they land
on the pages of parked domains. In this process, we identified
multiple types of abuse including malware, inappropriate ad-
vertising, and scams that could cost users their personal details
and hundreds of dollars. Next to the abuse affecting users, we
also discovered a significant fraction of typosquatting domains
being monetized through domain parking, and witnessed the
lack of controls by successfully parking an obviously abusive
domain with all domain parking services on which we could
get a parking account.
Motivated by the discovered abuse, we designed and built
a parked-page classifier which can be used to, among others,
block parked pages, or alert users that they are currently
interacting with a parked page. Instead of hardcoding parking
signatures, we compiled a list of generic and robust features
that are characteristic of parked pages and showed that our
classifier has a very high accuracy with only minimal false
positives.
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